Israeli Control of the Golan Remains Strategically Critical
DECISION BRIEF 6 January 2000
Publications of the Center for Security Policy No. 00-D 3
http://www.security-policy.org/papers/2000/00-D3.html
The Golan is a semi-mountainous escarpment of some 400 square miles, ranging
in height from 400 to 3,000 feet. It rises steeply from the eastern and northern
shores of the Sea of Galilee, runs the length of the Huleh Valley, and overlooks
the coastal plains of the Galilee and northern Israel.
At the end of World War I, during the division of the defeated Ottoman Empire,
the Golan Heights were included in the territory of British Mandate Palestine.
In 1923 they were transferred to French Mandate Syria under a Franco-British
agreement delineating the boundary between Mandate Syria and Mandate Palestine.
After Israel declared independence in 1948 and defeated the Syrian and other
Arab forces that invaded to destroy the new state, that boundary became the
basis for the Syrian-Israeli armistice line negotiated in 1949.
For the next eighteen years, until the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Syria used
its position on the Heights to shell Israeli farms and settlements in the
Galilee below and to attack Israeli water projects in the Huleh Valley. Syrians
on the Golan attempted to divert the headwaters of the Jordan River, which
would have severely curtailed Israel's water supply. Israel used military
force to oppose the diversion.
Israeli soldiers captured the Heights in the Six Day War of 1967. Six years
later, at the outbreak of the October 1973 Yom Kippur War, Syria mounted
a massive armored attack into the territory. In a costly stand, the Israeli
Defense Forces (IDF) stopped the Syrian thrust across the Golan and then
counter-attacked, driving a fifteen mile bulge into Syria. Israel later withdrew
from this bulge, but stayed on the Heights. In December, 1981, Israel enacted
legislation extending its civil law and administration to the Golan, replacing
the military authority which had ruled there for 14 years.
Since 1967 and the subsequent attempt in 1973 to retake the Heights, Syria
has used various means, including terrorism and diplomacy, to press Israel
to relinquish the Golan. Successive Israeli governments, under both Labor
and Likud, have characterized the Golan Heights as essential to Israeli security.
The Strategic Importance to Israel of the Golan Heights
First, holding the Heights gives Israel strategic depth. The Golan territory
is roughly 10 miles by 40 miles. All of Israel, including the Golan and the
West Bank, is only approximately 45 miles wide by 270 miles. (First-time
visitors to Israel almost invariably remark on how small the country is.)
Thus, in the north, the Golan Heights makes the territory under Israel's
control nearly fifty percent wider than it would be otherwise. This buffer
zone, this extension of territory where Israel faces its most formidable
enemy, is an important military asset for Israel. This remains true even
in the age of missile warfare. It bears noting that, in the summer of 1990,
all of Kuwait's valuable assets were in easy reach of Iraq's forces, which
took them quickly. But Saudi Arabia's key assets lay across wide stretches
of desert, which made an Iraqi conquest far more difficult. Though Iraq had
Scud missiles, Saudi Arabia's strategic depth spared it the fate of Kuwait.
Second, control of high ground on the Golan gives Israel direct line-of-sight
surveillance and warning of threatening Syrian movements in the plains below
or in south Lebanon. Early warning is important to a defense posture that
relies, in the event of war, upon a thin line of active forces to hold while
reserves mobilize to meet the kind of attacks that Syria's large and
well-equipped standing army might mount.
Third, modern technology has by no means eliminated altogether the disadvantages
of having to fight uphill, a reality acknowledged by military commanders
everywhere. The operational planning of the U.S. military, for example, still
places great emphasis on command of the high ground as a critical force
multiplier. Fourth, possession of the Golan puts the IDF within easy striking
range of Damascus. This contributes to Israeli deterrence against Syria.
If deterrence fails and war occurs again, Israel's Golan position enables
it to mount spoiling attacks against likely staging areas. And its proximity
to Damascus can help deter especially heinous actions -- for example, missile
attacks on Israel's cities.
Fifth, the Golan highlands are a major watershed. In that arid region with
its growing population increasing the demand for water, control of water
resources can have strategic consequences. The significance of this point
is often overlooked in military and political analyses, especially those
not produced locally. Control of the Golan permits control of Lake Kinneret
(the "Sea of Galilee") which supplies roughly thirty percent of Israel's
consumption.
Control of the Golan watershed and the Kinneret basin will further increase
in importance if Israel makes concessions regarding its other main source
of water, the watersheds of the West Bank. Water sources there now satisfy
more than thirty-three percent of Israel's needs. These are at issue in Israel's
negotiations with the PLO.
While the Golan's most difficult and most elevated terrain faces Israel,
the topography on the northern and eastern sides facing Syria also constitutes
a defensible barrier to massed armored attack. During the 1973 Yom Kippur
war, control of the Golan's rocky highlands enabled two brigades of the IDF
to hold off an attack of over 1,000 Syrian tanks.
Israel's current Chief-of-Staff, Lt. Gen. Ehud Barak, has recently reiterated
that, even under conditions of peace, the IDF must remain deployed on the
Golan. Maj. Gen (Res.) Yossi Peled, the previous commander of the IDF Northern
Command which has operational control of the Golan, warned in December, 1993
that an Israeli withdrawal from the Heights would constitute "national suicide."
If Israel found itself at war again with Syria, General Peled doubted that
Israel could ever retake the Golan as it did in the 1967 War, because of
the changes since then in the balance of forces.
Strategic Depth in the Age of Missiles
Even in the missile age, land -- strategic depth -- still matters. The Syrians
have missiles. But they are still investing heavily in their ground forces.
Major General Uri Sagi, head of the IDF Intelligence Branch, noted in April
1993:
...In the conventional field, Syria has improved and is improving its tank
fleet in a very impressive manner. If and when Syria will complete its
procurement transactions that it has already signed, all of its armored divisions
will be equipped with the latest model T-72 tanks. Today Syria has over 4,000
tanks and 300 self-propelled artillery tubes that provide it with an enhanced
offensive capability in land battles.
Many Middle Eastern nations are working to acquire ballistic missiles and
weapons of mass destruction, and many of these nations maintain a longstanding
hostility toward Israel. Nevertheless, the principal threat to Israel's existence
for the foreseeable future will remain the danger of a physical invasion
and occupation by heavily armored forces.
Simply stated, even though missiles can fly over the highest terrain feature,
including the Golan Heights, they do not negate the strategic significance
of territorial depth. The military value of missiles depends on their accuracy
-- on their ability to strike specific military targets. Inaccurate missiles
like the Scuds used by Iraq in the Gulf War can terrorize large urban areas.
But they are not reliable against military targets -- airfields, command
and control centers, bridges -- where precision is required.
If, however, the Syrians -- by violating a demilitarization regime, for example
-- were able to move heavy artillery up to the edge of the Golan escarpment
overlooking the Galilee and northern Israel, they could use their relatively
accurate artillery against military targets within a range of approximately
25 miles, depending on their ability to observe and correct fire. Artillery
munitions, of which Syria has large quantities, are relatively inexpensive,
especially compared to missiles. Destroying significant military targets
within this range would be a matter, in essence, of firing enough rounds.
On the other hand, if Israeli control of the Golan ensures that Syrian artillery
is confined to the plateau behind the Heights, few targets in Israel would
be within range of the Syrian artillery. Syria could attempt to strike those
targets with ballistic missiles, but then they would encounter the problem
of inaccuracy, not to mention the prohibitive cost and limited number of
weapons in inventory. Also, the United States and Israel both have programs
to develop defenses against ballistic missiles. Given adequate resources,
these programs may substantially limit the military effectiveness of offensive
missiles. There are, however, no defenses available against artillery other
than counter-fire to destroy the artillery pieces themselves, which is a
task of great difficulty, especially in rugged terrain like that of the Golan
Heights.
What is more, succeeding with missile attacks on distant military targets
would be nearly impossible in part because the essential function of damage
assessment would not be possible for Syrian missileers well behind the Golan.
(Targeting and damage assessment abilities would, however, be enhanced if
Syria gained access to high quality, real-time satellite imaging.) In short,
possession of intermediate-range ballistic missiles does not give Syria a
capability to fight Israel as effectively from behind the Golan Heights as
it could from the Heights themselves.
Achieving military success in a war requires more than lobbing a few score
(or even a few hundred) missiles of limited accuracy at soft targets. Iraq
fired approximately forty Scuds at Israel in the Gulf War, killing fewer
than ten civilians and no soldiers and achieving nothing of military
significance. To win a war against Israel, Syria must move armor, infantry
and artillery forward and down into Israeli proper, and then destroy Israeli
forces on the ground. This was true in 1948, it was true in 1967 and 1973,
and it remains true in today's Age of Missiles.
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Ariel Center for Policy Research (ACPR)
ad -The Golan Heights and the Facts - "The Torah Speaks of Four Sons..."
Ha'aretz, April 25, 2000
"What Says the Wise Son?"
*Could 177 Israeli tanks have fended off a surprise offensive of 1,400 Syrian
tanks, in October 1973, without the control of the mountain ridgeline (from
Mt. Hermon to the Rokad River), which is the present ceasefire line, a uniquely
effective natural tank barrier, and the watershed that determines the quantity
and the quality of Lake Kinneret's water (30% of Israel's water consumption)?
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“Israel has no strategic need to keep military control over the Golan Heights. Syria's adherence to the ceasefire on the Golan proves that Israel would not be endangered by returning that territory.” Myths & Facts Online. By Mitchell G. Bard
The Battle For The Golan - Op Ed. Aaron Lerner 30 June, 1999
(Originally appeared in The Jerusalem Post - 30 June 1999)
While only a minority of Israelis (26.7% of Israeli Jews in the May survey
of the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research) support full withdrawal
from the Golan, it would be naive to assume that Ehud Barak can't dramatically
shift public opinion.
The public can certainly understand that any mutual security arrangement
designed to assure Israel a 'fair fight' against Syria is inferior to the
Golan advantage Israel enjoys today. They can also appreciate the short life
of any technological edge - especially in light of America's propensity to
sell advanced weapons systems to Arab countries.
Israel's experience in the Yom Kippur War has been used by some withdrawal
protagonists as proof that the Golan does not provide security. If anything,
Israel's intelligence failure and preliminary responses in that war serve
as proof of the value of the strategic depth that the Golan provides.
For while today's early-warning stations are more sophisticated, they still
end up producing data that is subject to human interpretation. Is a force
movement near Damascus an error, a challenge or unrelated to Israel? The
'fair fight' redeployment leaves Israel little time to do anything but treat
any Syrian move as a challenge.
Paradoxically, rather than reducing the chances of open conflict, withdrawal
from the Golan raises by several magnitudes the possibility of war due to
misunderstanding.
Can the GRC and their supporters handle the job? Only time will tell. One
thing is certain: If the campaign fails, the personal loss to the Golan residents
will be nothing compared to the loss to the entire nation.
Dr. Aaron Lerner, Director IMRA (Independent Media Review & Analysis)
imra@netvision.net.il
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imra@netvision.net.il 02 April 2004
Etched in Stone? Letter from President Ford to Prime Minister Rabin
September 1, 1975
The U.S. will support the position that an overall settlement with Syria in the framework of a peace agreement must assure Israel's security from attack from the Golan Heights. The U.S. further supports the position that a just and lasting peace, which remains our objective, must be acceptable to both sides. The U.S. has not developed a final position on the borders. Should it do so it will give great weight to Israel's position that any peace agreement with Syria must be predicated on Israel remaining on the Golan Heights. My view in this regard was stated in our conversation of September 13, 1974.
Sincerely,
Gerald R. Ford
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Ze'ev Schiff: The IDF's border on the Golan Heights
Ha'aretz 14.1.2000
Excerpts:
* chief of staff Ehud Barak traced in 1994 a line which would enable the
IDF to hold on to the cliff on the Golan that overlooks the Hulah Valley...chief
of staff, Amnon Lipkin-Shahak presented this very same line when he met with
Shihabi for Rabin.
* The senior commanders of the IDF understand today that it will be impossible to obtain an agreement in which the new border with Syria will lie along the cliffs of the Golan Heights. Therefore, the members of the IDF's general staff are now saying that, from the military standpoint, there is only one question that must be asked: Will the IDF remain on the cliff overlooking the Hulah Valley or will it have to descend into that valley? If the IDF is forced to go down into the Hulah Valley, there is no difference, militarily speaking, between the June 4, 1967 lines and the international boundary drawn in 1923. In other words, whether or not we control the El-Hama enclave has no military importance whatsover. Thus, the planning division of the general staff does not regard the water resources problem as a military question.
However, this position is an evasion of the real issue. Water - especially that of Israel's main (and only) reservoir, the Sea of Galilee - is not some irrelevant military question, but is, in fact, a central strategic problem of national proportions. And it should therefore be a major item on the IDF's agenda. The general staff's attempts to evade this issue is a classic example of "thinking small."
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IMRA'S WEEKLY COMMENTARY ON ARUTZ 7 - Aaron Lerner 16 February, 2000
(Broadcast in English on Thursday nights at 10:00 PM on 98.7 FM and on 711
AM throughout Israel - recording available on
http://www.a7.org)
The Big News That No One Noticed
Prime Minister Ehud Barak likes to project the image that he is completely in charge...So one would assume that BEFORE Barak even went to meet the Syrians in Shepherdstown that he had all the information he needed not just for a photo opportunity but for serious negotiations.
That's why I was so surprised when Ha'aretz Diplomatic Correspondent Aluf Benn reported on March 13 that Prime Minister Ehud Barak was still waiting for a professional opinion from Military Intelligence, which would decide whether American technology is a sufficient substitute for the Hermon.
Let me repeat this because it is so mind boggling: as of this Monday Prime Minister Ehud Barak was still waiting for a professional opinion from Israeli Military Intelligence, if American technology is a sufficient substitute for the Hermon.
By the way - this incredible news was buried in the middle of an article.
But this was only the beginning.
For those of you who think that the army is full only of yes men consider
this next item:
Ha'aretz Diplomatic Correspondent Aluf Benn reported on March 16 - just yesterday
- that Israeli Military Intelligence decided that the surveillance technology
America offered to replace the Golan with is not a sufficient substitute
for the Hermon.
Again - because this item is so important I will repeat it: Israeli Military Intelligence decided that the technology America offered to replace the Golan with is not a sufficient substitute for the Hermon.
In a normal country this would be front-page news. The morning radio programs would be interviewing everybody and his brother about the ramifications of the finding and the talking wouldn't stop until Barak had no choice but to tell the public what he planned to do given that American gizmos can't replace the Golan.
By the way, Aluf Benn does report that the Israelis think that they may be able to develop their own gizmos to replace the surveillance coverage of the Golan - but the opening estimate is that it will take five years and a billion dollars to develop and introduce into active service an alternative early-warning system that will provide the IDF with coverage similar to that provided by the existing station on Mount Hermon.
It doesn't take much familiarity with the way defense projects are to know three things about this kind of estimate:
One: The price tag at the end will bear no resemblance to the opening estimate.
Two: There is no telling how long it would really take to develop something when the opening estimate is already half a decade
Three: Most important of all, when you think it is going to take a billion dollars and five years to make a gizmo to replace the Golan there is no certainty that such a gizmo can ever actually be made.
And you certainly would not sign an agreement to leave the Golan banking on a yet to be developed gizmo.
This leaves us with a completely different perception of Ehud Barak.
Instead of the careful planner, we find that Barak is no better than a sky diver who jumps out of a plane, with the hubris to assume that somehow a parachute will show up on the way down.
Again though - please keep your eyes on the ball: as of yesterday it is official: there is no substitute for the Golan.
Dr. Aaron Lerner, Director IMRA (Independent Media Review & Analysis)
imra@netvision.net.il
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Aaron Lerner Date: 24 March, 2000
The news that the U.S. opted to keep Israel in the dark about a critical
problem in the Patriot missiles and then opted not to share any replacement
missiles with the Jewish State is the last in a series of recent developments
that undermines "gizmos for the Golan".
Israel Radio reported today that the U.S. opted to use the available supply
of functioning Patriot missiles to replace its own defective missiles and
that none are available for Israel.
The defect causes the communication systems of missiles that are kept on
high alert status to fail. The communications system links the missile with
the guiding ground station.
Lt. Gen. Paul Kern, a senior Army acquisitions officer, said Thursday that
the US did not tell Israel or the other countries that operate U.S.-made
Patriot missile batteries about the problem until they were already completing
the replacement of the American missile batteries.
According to Rear Adm. Craig Quigley, a Pentagon spokesman, the defect is
particularly problematic for Israel, since, like the United States, it tends
to keep more of its Patriot launchers on full alert.
Other recent developments:
+ The U.S. government made it clear to Israel this week that if it does withdraw
from the Golan that the American supply of "gizmos for the Golan" would be
conditional on issues not relating to the withdrawal. For the time being,
the American concern is Israeli arms sales to China, but with the precedent
set that America reserves the right to use the supply of American-made gizmos
to press Israel on other matters, there is no telling how this heavy "stick"
will be used to promote American interest in the future.
+ The recent U.S. sale of the most advanced F-16 jet in the world to the
United Arab Emirates (more advanced than the jets even the U.S. Air Force
can afford) serves as a reminder that petrodollars are more important than
American promises of a "gizmo edge" for Israel.
+ Last week Prime Minister Barak was advised by his military experts that
there are no gizmos available today that can replace the observation post
on Mount Hermon and that the initial estimate is that it would take a billion
dollars and five years to develop such a gizmo and bring into operations.
With "gizmos for the Golan" a critical element in Prime Minister Ehud Barak's
justification of withdrawal from the Golan as a "calculated risk" these recent
developments may very well be watershed events.
Dr. Aaron Lerner, Director IMRA (Independent Media Review & Analysis)
imra@netvision.net.il
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